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BARELY LEGAL: VAGUENESS AND THE
PROHIBITION OF PORNOGRAPHY AS A
CONDITION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE
MICHAEL SMITH†
INTRODUCTION
Nationwide, over five million men and women were on
probation or parole at the end of 2006.1 Yet, having been
released from jail, they are far from free. They exist in the penal
equivalent of purgatory, waiting for the day when they can once
again rejoin society as free citizens. Until then, although not
confined to the hell of prison, they are subject to the conditions of
their release, the violation of which may send them back to jail.
Sometimes, these conditions prohibit otherwise noncriminal
activity and even restrict constitutional freedoms. Judges are
given wide latitude in determining what discretionary conditions
to impose on a probationer. For example, a judge can prohibit a
probationer from associating with certain people, accessing the
Internet, or viewing pornography.
These conditions are
essentially criminal statutes unique to the probationer. Thus,
not only must probationers follow the laws that everyone in
society must follow, they must follow rules that prohibit specific
noncriminal conduct.
Even though people on probation, parole, or supervised
release have their constitutional rights curtailed, they are still
entitled to some protections, namely due process of the law. A
basic principle of due process is the right to be free from vague
statutes. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Supreme Court
enumerated three reasons why vague statutes are
unconstitutional.2 First, a statute must “give the person of
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2000, New York University.
1
LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, 1 (2007),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1106.
2
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
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ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited.”3 Such a law allows a person to “act accordingly.”4 As
the Court noted, “[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning.”5 Second, the law must provide explicit
standards to those charged with applying the law in order to
prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement . . . . A vague
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.”6 Finally, the Court stated that a vague law that
encroaches upon “sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms” naturally “inhibit[s] the exercise of [those] freedoms”7
because individuals who are uncertain of the meaning of a
statute will “ ‘steer far wider’ ” than necessary in order to ensure
compliance.8
Most probation conditions imposed are specific and do not
raise vagueness concerns. Recently, however, circuit courts have
split over whether imposing a general prohibition on viewing or
possessing “pornography” is too vague. The Third and Ninth
Circuits have held that imposing this condition without defining
“pornography” violates the probationer’s due process rights.9
Supporting these circuits, the Second Circuit agreed that the
term “pornography” is inherently vague, yet has not found a
factual scenario to overturn the imposition of the condition.10 In
contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that the condition prohibiting

3

Id. at 108.
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 108–09.
7
Id. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) and quoting
Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Ins., 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)).
8
Id. (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
9
United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prohibition on
pornography is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide any method for
Loy or his probation officer to distinguish between those items that are merely
titillating and those items that are ‘pornographic.’ ”); United States v. Guagliardo,
278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the term “pornography” is “entirely
subjective” and “lacks any recognized legal definition”).
10
See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting
that although it is difficult to define pornography, under federal law the “definition
of pornography . . . is sufficiently specific to give adequate notice as to what conduct
violates a prohibition on pornographic material”).
4
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the viewing or possession of “pornography” does not violate due
process rights because there is a commonsense definition of
“pornography” that gives probationers sufficient notice.11
This Note argues that a judge violates a probationer’s right
to sufficiently specific conditions of supervised release that
provide fair warning and curtail arbitrary and discriminatory
application when he or she imposes a ban on viewing or
possessing pornography because the term lacks a specific legal
definition.12 For a condition banning “pornography” to be validly
imposed, a sufficiently specific definition of pornography must be
developed that satisfies due process while also achieving the
goals of probation and preserving judicial flexibility in imposing
sentences.
Part I of this Note will discuss the current sentencing
scheme in the federal system. It will discuss the goals of
sentencing under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the
“Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) and the discretion given
to judges in imposing appropriate sentences, as well as some
procedural safeguards. Additionally, Part I will discuss the
process of supervised release, including how judges impose
conditions and the process for revoking supervised release if a
probationer violates a condition.13 Part II of this Note will
discuss the circuit split over the imposition of a general ban on
legal adult pornography. Finally, Part III of this Note will
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of requiring district
courts to give a sufficiently specific definition of pornography
when setting conditions of supervised release. Also, Part III will
provide a specific definition of pornography that satisfies the
Supreme Court’s vagueness concerns in Grayned and will show
how this definition properly balances the rights of the
probationer—namely, the right to conditions that are not

11

United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 193 (5th Cir. 2003).
The courts also use the terms “sexually stimulating” or “sexually oriented”
material. Arguably, those terms are even vaguer than “pornography.” For example,
advertisements for women’s underwear are not pornographic but could be considered
sexually stimulating. Thus, while this Note will focus on the word “pornography,”
the analysis applies equally to the terms “sexually stimulating” or “sexually
oriented” material, and the proposed definition could also apply to these terms.
13
While this Note focuses on the federal system, because the condition imposed
implicates constitutional concerns and given the similarities between conditions of
supervised release, parole and probation, the analysis could apply equally to state
courts imposing a similar condition.
12
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vague—with the goals of supervised release—ensuring public
safety and furthering the probationer’s rehabilitation.
I.

A.

SENTENCING AND SUPERVISED RELEASE IN THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM
The Sentencing Guidelines

The Sentencing Guidelines are a vast scheme of regulations
promulgated in 198714 by the Sentencing Commission15 and
designed to accomplish several goals,16 namely uniformity,
proportionality, and “honesty” in sentencing.17 The Guidelines
prescribe sentencing ranges for various federal crimes based on a
variety of factors that judges use to determine what specific
sentence to impose.18 The Guidelines also allow judges to impose
sentences greater or lesser than the range if the judge finds
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.19 Until the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker20 in 2005 declaring the
mandatory nature of the Guidelines unconstitutional,21 the
Guidelines were mandatory and district court judges were
required to impose the sentence given after making the requisite
calculation.22 Currently, the Guidelines are advisory, although
district court judges are still required to consult them.23

14
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009) (guidelines
submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987 and took effect on November 1, 1987).
15
The Commission itself was created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–
673 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2006)).
16
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (listing several factors to consider when a judge
imposes sentences which embody the principles of deterrence, incapacitation, just
punishment, and rehabilitation); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1A1.2.
17
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009).
18
Id. § 1A1.2 (“The Commission is required to prescribe guideline ranges that
specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons determined by
coordinating the offense behavior categories with the offender characteristic
categories.”).
19
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (stating that a court can depart from the guideline
ranges if it “finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission”).
20
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
21
Id. at 244–45.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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The Guidelines allow judges to impose a term of supervised
release during sentencing.24 Supervised release is a period of
time after the convict has been released from prison during
which the convict must follow certain conditions imposed on him
or her by the court.25 Once the term of supervised release
expires, the convict has completed his or her sentence and is once
again a free person.
The Guidelines advise judges to impose certain mandatory
conditions of supervised release, such as a prohibition on
possessing a controlled substance and a prohibition on violating
any federal, state, or local laws.26 The Guidelines also suggest
other, discretionary conditions that should be imposed depending
on the nature of the crime.27 Courts have wide discretion in
setting conditions of supervised release,28 including the authority

24

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 (2009). The Guidelines
require a term of supervised release when a judge imposes a sentence of more than
one year or when required by statute. Id. § 5D1.1(a). The judge is also allowed to
impose supervised release “in any other case.” Id. § 5D1.1(b). Subsection (b) applies
if the judge finds that supervised release is necessary “for any of the following
reasons: (1) to protect the public welfare; (2) to enforce a financial condition; (3) to
provide drug or alcohol treatment or testing; (4) to assist the reintegration of the
defendant into the community; or (5) to accomplish any other sentencing purpose
authorized by statute.” Id. § 5D1.1 cmts. 1–2.
25
See Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha and Omega of Supervised Release, 60
ALB. L. REV. 267, 269 (1996). Judge Baer, District Court Judge for the Southern
District of New York, goes into great detail and provides a helpful analysis of
supervised release, its imposition and revocation. He notes that supervised release is
different from parole and probation. Id. Parole is a release from prison before a
convict has completed his sentence of imprisonment, supervised release is imposed
in addition to imprisonment, and probation is a sentence where imprisonment is
suspended. Id. at 269–70. However, the Second Circuit has noted that “supervised
release is essentially similar to parole.” United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121
(2d Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court also noted that probation and parole are
“constitutionally indistinguishable.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3
(1973); see also United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 527 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993).
26
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(a) (2009).
27
Id. § 5B1.3(c)–(e).
28
See United States v. Jorge-Salgado, 520 F.3d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Henkel, 358 F.3d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 2004)); United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d
72, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). For an example of this discretion, consider United States v.
Brogdon, where a trial court imposed, and the Sixth Circuit upheld, a condition
prohibiting the defendant from possessing pornographic material even though he
pleaded guilty to “being a felon in possession of a firearm.” 503 F.3d 555, 557 (6th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1211 (2008). The court found the imposition was
reasonable based on the defendant’s criminal history of indecent exposure, even
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to curtail constitutional freedoms.29 The Supreme Court has
noted that a probationer, while having more freedom than
someone who is incarcerated, is still serving a sentence and can
have freedoms curtailed.30 The Guidelines allow judges to impose
any condition as long as that condition is “reasonably related to
the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the
extent that such condition[ ] involve[s] only such deprivations of
liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes
indicated in section 3553(a)(2).”31 Under section 3553(a)(1), when
imposing a condition of supervised release, a judge must consider
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant.”32 Moreover, under section
3553(a)(2), the judge must consider
the need for the sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.33

though the most recent incident occurred eleven years prior to his conviction for
possession of a firearm. Id. at 558, 565.
29
See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 n.2 (2006) (“[P]arolee’s
constitutional rights are indeed limited . . . .”) (dicta); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 483 (1972) (finding that states have the ability to impose restrictions on a
parolee’s liberty); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 497 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
nonobscene pornographic material is protected by the First Amendment when
possessed by “ordinary adults, but may be regulated in the hands of parolees to a
much greater extent”); Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding
that the government can infringe on the rights of parolees as long as it is reasonably
and necessarily related to the government’s legitimate interests). Besides First
Amendment restrictions, the state can restrict Fourth Amendment freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852–53; see also Isaac
B. Rosenberg, Involuntary Endogenous RFID Compliance Monitoring as a Condition
of Federal Supervised Release—Chips Ahoy?, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 331, 348–49
(2008) (collecting cases allowing for deprivations of liberty as a condition of
supervised release).
30
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48 (2007).
31
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (2006); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5B1.3(b) (2009).
32
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
33
Id. § 3553(a)(2).
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After considering the above factors, the judge must state with
specificity the reasons for imposing the conditions to facilitate
appellate review.34
B.

Revocation of Supervised Release35

A term of supervised release does not begin until the
probationer is released from prison.36 Once released, a probation
officer provides a written statement to the probationer detailing
with sufficient specificity the conditions imposed.37
The
probation officer must supervise the probationer to ensure that
he or she is following the conditions,38 and the officer is also
responsible to report any violations to the sentencing court.39
Probationers accused of violating supervised release are
entitled to some procedural due process, but not to the same
extent as a person accused of a crime,40 even though for practical
purposes the result—punishment if found guilty—is the same.
The professed reason for the lesser degree of due process is that
the revocation of supervised release is “not a criminal
proceeding.”41 Therefore, a probationer is not entitled to a jury
and does not have a Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.42 Also, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
generally does not apply; hearsay can be admissible evidence,
and the government need only prove a violation by a
preponderance of the evidence instead of beyond a reasonable
doubt.43

34
Id. § 3553(c). On appeal, an appellate court reviews the imposition for abuse
of discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
35
For a detailed discussion of supervised release and revocation proceedings, see
generally Baer, supra note 25.
36
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (2006).
37
18 U.S.C. § 3583(f) (2006).
38
18 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3603(2), (4) (2006).
39
Id. § 3603(2), (8)(B).
40
United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[M]ost of the
fundamental constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a
criminal prosecution are not required for supervised-release proceedings as a matter
of constitutional law.”) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)); see also
United States v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] defendant is afforded
only the minimum requirements of due process at a revocation hearing.”) (citing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972)).
41
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984).
42
See Baer, supra note 25, at 287–90.
43
Id. at 288–89.
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In general, a probationer accused of violating a condition of
supervised release is entitled to two hearings, a preliminary
hearing and a revocation hearing.44 The court may issue a
warrant, or a probation officer, without a warrant but with
probable cause, may arrest a probationer suspected of violating a
condition of supervised release.45 If the probationer is in custody
for the violation, then the court must have a prompt preliminary
hearing “to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that a violation occurred.”46 A court is required to give the
probationer:
(i) notice of the hearing and its purpose, the alleged violation,
and the person’s right to retain counsel or to request that
counsel be appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel; (ii) an
opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence; and
(iii) upon request, an opportunity to question any adverse
witness, unless the judge determines that the interest of justice
does not require the witness to appear.47

If the judge determines that there is probable cause that a
violation occurred, then he or she must hold a revocation
hearing48 “within a reasonable time.”49 In advance of the
hearing, a probationer is entitled to:
(A) written notice of the alleged violation; (B) disclosure of the
evidence against the person; (C) an opportunity to appear,
present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the
court determines that the interest of justice does not require the
witness to appear; (D) notice of the person’s right to retain
counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person
cannot obtain counsel; and (E) an opportunity to make a
statement and present any information in mitigation.50

Once a court determines that a probationer violated a
condition of supervised release, it may revoke the probationer’s
supervised release and have that person incarcerated.51 The
court can order imprisonment up to the full time allowed under

44

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)–(2).
18 U.S.C. § 3606 (2006).
46
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(A). The probationer may waive the hearing. Id.
47
Id. 32.1(b)(1)(B).
48
Id. 32.1(b)(1)(C). A revocation hearing, however, may also be waived by the
probationer. Id. 32.1(b)(2).
49
Id. 32.1(b)(2).
50
Id. 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(E).
51
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
45
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the statute under which the probationer was originally
convicted.52 A court is not required to give credit for any time of
supervised release already served.53 Additionally, a probationer
can be punished for violating a condition of supervised release
and punished for the underlying conduct, if the conduct violates a
law, without implicating double jeopardy concerns.54
Given the wide discretion courts may exercise in crafting
conditions of supervised release and the dire consequences of
violating a condition, it is imperative that the conditions imposed
on the probationer be sufficiently specific to allow him or her to
avoid that conduct which would violate the condition.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROHIBITING POSSESSION OF
PORNOGRAPHY
Circuits
are
split
over
the
constitutionality
of
imposing a general ban on possession of “pornography” as a
condition of supervised release,55 specifically, whether the term
52
Id. However, the term of imprisonment is subject to maximums under
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The maximums are up to five years if convicted of a Class A
felony, up to three years if convicted of a class B felony, up to two years if convicted
of a Class C or D felony, or up to one year in any other cases. Id. For example,
someone convicted of a Class C felony could have had a maximum term of
imprisonment of twenty-four years and 364 days and an original term of supervised
release of three years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (2006); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). Upon revocation, a court could only impose a maximum term
of imprisonment of two years. However, if the probationer had served the maximum
sentence of imprisonment, his imprisonment would now exceed that by two years.
See Baer, supra note 25, at 292–93.
53
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
54
See United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1122–23 (2d Cir. 1994).
55
State courts have also reviewed similar conditions imposed on state parolees
or probationers. States are similarly split as to whether the imposition of such a
condition is unconstitutionally vague. Compare McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 447
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding condition prohibiting possession of pornographic or
sexually explicit materials was unconstitutionally vague), Fitzgerald v. State, 805
N.E.2d 857, 866–67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (same), State v. Bahl, 193 P.3d 678, 688
(Wash. 2008) (same), and State v. Sansone, 111 P.3d 1251, 1255 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005) (same), with Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 84, 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that a commonsense reading of the phrase “sexually arousing materials”
does not render the ambiguous phrase unconstitutionally vague regarding its use in
a condition of probation), and Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277, 281–82 (Tex. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that condition prohibiting possession of “ ‘sexually stimulating’ or
‘sexually oriented’ ” material was not unconstitutionally vague). See also
Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that a
condition is not unconstitutionally vague when statutes provide definitions of the
terms). But cf. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 814–15 (Fla. 2008) (applying the
rule that ambiguous statutes are to be construed in favor of the criminal defendant
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“pornography” as it applies to conditions of supervised release is
inherently vague. The Third and Ninth Circuits held that it is.
The Second Circuit stated that the term is inherently vague but
has not expressly overturned the imposition of a condition
banning pornography. The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the
term is not inherently vague.56
A.

Void for Vagueness Doctrine

Embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
void-for-vagueness doctrine57 invalidates any statute58 that is “so
in interpreting an ambiguous statute providing for a condition prohibiting
possession of pornographic materials). Because vagueness is a constitutional issue,
the analysis and the definition are applicable to state law.
56
While the Third, Ninth, Second, and Fifth Circuits have all taken a position
on this issue, other circuits have only ruled that there was no plain error on the part
of the district court, but did not decide whether, when properly reviewed, they would
find the condition unconstitutional. See United States v. Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x
750, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695
(8th Cir. 2003).
57
The Supreme Court case of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972), exemplifies the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. In
Papachristou, the Court held that Jacksonville’s vagrancy law was void for
vagueness, violating both prongs of the vagueness test. Id. at 162. First, the Court
found that the law failed to give fair notice because “[t]he Jacksonville ordinance
makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally innocent.” Id. at
163. The Court also found that the statute prohibited “activities [that] are
historically part of the amenities of life” and activities that “have encouraged lives of
high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.” Id. at 164. Second, the Court
found that the ordinance gave “unfettered discretion” to the Jacksonville Police. Id.
at 168. It stated that there were no standards “governing the exercise of the
discretion” to the police, and that this type of law encourages “arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups
deemed to merit their displeasure.’ ” Id. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940)). The ordinance, according to the Court, required people to
“comport themselves according to the life style deemed appropriate by the
Jacksonville police and the courts.” Id.
58
It should be noted that it is questionable whether the void-for-vagueness
doctrine applies to conditions of supervised release. The Supreme Court has never
ruled that it does, although lower courts have applied the doctrine to conditions of
supervised release. See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2006)
(applying vagueness doctrine to condition of probation); United States v. Guagliardo,
278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 262 (3d Cir.
2001); United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1999). Also, in Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court noted that conditions are sometimes “quite
vague” but did not apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Id. at 479. Regardless, no
circuit court has ruled that void-for-vagueness should not be applied to conditions of
supervised release. However, none of the courts explain why the doctrine should
apply to conditions of supervised release. Arguably, the courts may feel that it is so
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vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application.”59 The Supreme
Court has fashioned a two-prong test to determine whether a
statute is void for vagueness.60 Either prong can be satisfied to
strike down a law as void-for-vagueness. First, a statute will be
void if it “fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits.”61 The
purpose of this prong is to ensure a statute gives fair notice to
enable a person to “conform his or her conduct to the law.”62
Second, a statute will be void if it “may authorize and even
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”63 For
example, a vague statute may allow “ ‘a standardless sweep
[that] allows policemen [and] prosecutors . . . to pursue their
personal predilections.’ ”64
While the Supreme Court has noted that a statute is not
vague when a person “exercising ordinary common sense can
sufficiently understand” the statute,65 a statute will be
considered unconstitutionally vague if enforcement depends on a
completely subjective standard.66 Thus, if it is up to the police
officer on the street to decide what conduct falls within the
statute because the statute itself does not define the prohibited
conduct, then enforcement depends on a completely subjective
standard.

obvious that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to conditions of supervised
release that they feel no need to justify the application. Practically speaking, the
application of this doctrine to conditions of supervised makes sense. Although
conditions are unique to the person on whom it is imposed, they are state-enforced
prohibitions on conduct, the violation of which may lead to punishment, like any
criminal statute. See United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843–44 (9th Cir. 1977).
59
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966) (holding that a law violates due process if
it is not sufficiently definite).
60
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (plurality opinion).
61
Id.; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
62
Morales, 527 U.S. at 58.
63
Id. at 56; see also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
64
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974))
(noting that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is “the more important aspect
of [the] vagueness doctrine”).
65
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579
(1973).
66
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972); see also Coates v.
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (holding that a statute is impermissibly vague
when it prohibits conduct that annoys some but would not annoy others).
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Circuit Court Split: Is “Pornography” a Vague Term?

While not all laws will be struck down merely because they
are vague,67 the Supreme Court requires laws that affect
constitutionally protected rights, especially First Amendment
rights, to meet the stringent standards of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, and it has not hesitated to strike down a law designed
to protect the public and enacted with a valid purpose if it is too
vague.68 Some circuit courts have been equally adamant that,
though there may be valid purposes, conditions of supervised
release prohibiting the possession of pornography must be
overturned because the term itself is inherently vague.
1.

Third Circuit: Pornography Is Inherently Vague

In United States v. Loy,69 the Third Circuit held that a
condition prohibiting possession of “ ‘all forms of pornography,
including legal adult pornography’ ”70 is unconstitutionally vague
“because it fails to provide any method for [defendant] or his
probation officer to distinguish between those items that are
merely titillating and those items that are ‘pornographic.’ ”71
Also, the court held that the prohibition did not “provide any
guidance as to whether the restriction extends only to visual
materials, or whether purely textual works and sound recordings
fall within its scope.”72 The Third Circuit did not forbid a district
court from prohibiting a probationer from viewing or possessing
pornography, but required that the condition must be “more
tightly defined.”73
In Loy, Ray Donald Loy was convicted of receiving and
possessing child pornography.74
Loy had answered an
advertisement in a “sexually explicit” magazine that invited
readers, in a round about way, to trade pornography involving

67
See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982) (“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as
the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the
nature of the enactment.”).
68
See Morales, 527 U.S. at 62, 64.
69
United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001).
70
Id. at 253.
71
Id. at 254.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 267.
74
Id. at 253.
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children.75 In exchange for a video of young girls bathing, Loy
agreed to send a video of children engaging in sex.76 However,
the advertisement was part of a joint undercover child
pornography investigation conducted by the United States Postal
Inspection Service and the Pennsylvania State Attorney
General’s Office.77 Law enforcement officers arrested Loy at his
home after they observed him pick up the videotape of children
bathing at his post office box.78 In his home, inspectors found
another tape depicting child pornography, as well as fifteen
computer disks, also containing child pornography.79 After
pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in the
mail, Loy was sentenced to thirty-three months of incarceration
and three years of supervised release.80 The District Court
imposed a condition prohibiting Loy from possessing “ ‘all forms
of pornography, including legal adult pornography.’ ”81 Loy
appealed the imposition of that condition.82
In overturning the imposition of the condition prohibiting
possession of pornography, the Third Circuit reasoned that,
unlike obscenity, “the term ‘pornography’ . . . has never received
a precise legal definition from the Supreme Court or any other
federal court of appeals, and remains undefined in the federal
code.”83 The court noted that it could provide “numerous
examples of books and films” that it could not say definitely were
or were not pornographic.84 The court also noted that the
government was not able to determine whether Playboy would be
prohibited.85
Finally, because neither the court nor the
75

Id. at 254.
Id. at 254–55.
77
Id. at 254.
78
Id. at 255.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 253.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 263. The court noted, however, that federal law contains a definition of
child pornography. Id. at 263 n.4.
84
Id. at 264. The court listed as examples Playboy, which contained nudity but
not sexual conduct, the film adaptations of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, some Calvin
Klein advertisements, and Edouard Manet’s Le Dejeuner sur L’Herbe, which depicts
a nude woman lunching with two fully dressed men. Id. The court further noted that
it could not determine whether the condition prohibiting pornography applied only
to visual materials or if it included pure text and sound recordings. Id.
85
Id. The court stated that “[e]ven the government conceded . . . that it does not
know whether Playboy is part of this group, which is, in fact, a change from its
76
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government could discern what material was prohibited, the
court found it unfair to assume that the probationer could do so
in advance.86
In addition to finding that the probationer could not
reasonably determine what material was prohibited and what
was not, the Third Circuit held that the condition gave “the
probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation.”87 It
noted that this power would “create one of the very problems
against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the
delegation of ‘basic policy matters to policemen . . . for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ”88 As a solution, the Third
Circuit recommended that a judge imposing conditions of
supervised release borrow applicable language from the federal
statutory definition of child pornography at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).89
2.

Ninth Circuit: Pornography Is Inherently Vague

Agreeing with the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Guagliardo,90 held that a “blanket prohibition” on
pornography violated a probationer’s due process rights because
of the inherent vagueness of the term.91 In Guagliardo, Thomas
Guagliardo engaged in an online chat with an undercover police
detective claiming to have a large collection of child pornography,
position, taken during oral argument, that Playboy absolutely constituted
‘pornography.’ ” Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 266.
88
Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972)).
89
Id. at 267. The relevant portion of the statute reads, “any visual depiction,
including any photography, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated
image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 267 n.8.
90
United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
91
Id. at 872. The Ninth Circuit later approved a condition that prohibited
possession of pornography that was tied to the definition of sexually explicit
material in the federal child pornography statute. See United States v. Rearden, 349
F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003). This is in line with the Third Circuit’s suggestion in
Loy that district courts use that specific language to overcome a vagueness
challenge. See Loy, 237 F.3d at 267. The Second Circuit also held that if a person is
convicted under the child pornography statute, then there is no vagueness issue with
regard to a condition prohibiting possession of pornography since it is defined within
the statute. See United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2003); United
States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 2003). But see United States v. Voelker,
489 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that, even though the district court
imposed a condition prohibiting sexually explicit material as defined in a federal
statute, the condition was not “narrowly tailored”).
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and agreed to meet with the undercover detective to give him
copies of some of his collection.92 When Guagliardo gave the
detective three computer disks containing child pornography, the
detective arrested him.93 After a bench trial, Guagliardo was
convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to
fifteen months imprisonment followed by three years of
supervised release.94 The trial court imposed a condition of
supervised release that prohibited Guagliardo from possessing
any pornography, including legal adult pornography.95
Guagliardo appealed the conviction and the condition.96
In overturning the imposition of the condition, the Ninth
Circuit noted that “a probationer cannot reasonably understand
what is encompassed” by the pornography prohibition because
the “term itself is entirely subjective” and “it lacks any
recognized legal definition.”97 The court pointed out that the
district court itself could not define the term and scoffed at the
district court’s declaration that it would not “ ‘have any trouble
defining it if [Guagliardo] violate[d] it.’ ”98
3.

Second Circuit: While Pornography May Be Vague, the
Court Has Not Overturned the Imposition

The Second Circuit’s approach to conditions of supervised
release prohibiting the possession of pornography is less
straightforward than the Third and Ninth Circuits—which
require sentencing judges to define the term “pornography.”
First, in United States v. Simmons,99 the Second Circuit held that
the term “pornography” is inherently vague.100 However, the
court affirmed the condition imposed by the trial court, which
prohibited possession of “any pornographic material, including
videotapes, films, magazines, books and photographs, nor shall
he subscribe to ‘adult-only’ movie channels.”101
The court

92

Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 870.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 872.
96
Id. at 870.
97
Id. at 872.
98
Id. (“This after-the-fact definition . . . leaves Guagliardo in [an] untenable
position . . . .”).
99
United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003).
100
Id. at 82.
101
Id. at 77.
93
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reasoned that since Simmons was convicted under a statute that
contained a definition of pornography, he was on notice as to
what material the condition prohibited.102
In Simmons, Alan Simmons pleaded guilty to “knowingly
transporting a minor in foreign commerce for the purpose of
engaging in illegal sexual conduct” and “to using a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a
videotape of the conduct.”103 Simmons, a Canadian, took a ski
trip to Vermont with his two sons, aged nine and twelve, and a
fifteen-year-old girl, B.B., whom Simmons had coached in a girls’
hockey league and whose mother Simmons had dated.104 After a
day of skiing, they all ate dinner and watched videos.105
Simmons prepared drinks for the kids, and later they fell asleep
but did not wake up until noon the next day.106 The girl thought
this was unusual because she was an early riser; however, she
did not suspect any wrongdoing.107
Four years later, Canadian authorities, while executing a
search warrant in connection with an alcohol and tobacco
smuggling case, seized a videotape of Simmons sexually abusing
an unconscious adolescent female.108 After investigating, the
authorities determined that the tape had been made in Vermont
during the ski trip and that the girl in the tape was B.B.109 A
federal grand jury in Vermont indicted Simmons, and he
subsequently pleaded guilty to both charges contained in the
indictment.110 He was sentenced to 168 months imprisonment, to
be followed by three years of supervised release.111 He appealed,
among other things, the condition of supervised release that
prohibited him from possessing any pornographic material.112
In affirming the condition, the Second Circuit held that when
a defendant is convicted under a statutory scheme that includes
a definition of pornography, he is given “adequate notice as to
102

Id. at 81–82; see also United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir.

2003).
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Simmons, 343 F.3d at 74.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 74–75.
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what conduct violates a prohibition on pornographic material.”113
Simmons was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) for persuading
a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
producing a videotape.114 The court noted that the statute fell
under the same chapter of the United States Code that contained
a definition of child pornography.115 According to the court, the
section’s “definition of pornography avoids reference to subjective
standards and is sufficiently specific to give adequate notice as to
what conduct violates a prohibition on pornographic material.”116
The court did not require the district court to explicitly reference
the definition, but “urge[d] them to do so in future cases,
particularly since in other contexts the term [was] inherently
vague.”117
In Farrell v. Burke,118 the Second Circuit again held that the
term “pornography” is inherently vague,119 but refused to strike
down the condition as being void for vagueness because it found,
as applied to Farrell, that the material he possessed “fit[ ] within
any reasonable understanding of the term” pornography.120
In Farrell, Christopher J. Farrell filed a federal civil rights
claim alleging that his parole officers violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights by enforcing a condition of his
parole that prohibited possession of pornographic material.121
Farrell had been arrested after paying four boys between the
ages of thirteen and sixteen to have anal and oral sex with him at
his home.122 He pleaded guilty in state court to three counts of
sodomy in the third degree.123 After serving almost four years, he
113

Id. at 82.
Id. at 81 n.6.
115
Id. at 81.
116
Id. at 82.
117
Id.
118
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2006).
119
Id. at 490. In fact, the court went to great lengths to reiterate the fact that
the term is inherently vague. Id. at 486. It quoted from both the Third and Ninth
Circuits, id. at 487–88, state appellate courts, id. at 488 n.4, and New York case law,
id. at 488. It rejected the state’s argument that it should “reject the holdings of these
cases” because the term pornography can be determined by “value-free criteria.” Id.
The court finally noted that its ruling did not “in any way challenge the earlier cases
from this Circuit and others finding that the term is insufficient to give notice to a
reasonable offender of what material sweeps within its prohibition.” Id. at 490.
120
Id. at 490.
121
Id. at 476.
122
Id. It is unclear how he was arrested.
123
Id.
114
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was paroled.124
The parole officer imposed the standard
conditions that New York law requires, as well as a special
condition that Farrell would “not own or possess any
pornographic material.”125 Four months before Farrell’s parole
was to expire, his parole officers visited him.126 At Farrell’s
apartment, the officers found three publications—a book called
Scum: True Homosexual Experiences, a magazine called My
Comrade with the headline “Gay Sex! The Shocking Truth!,” and
an anthology called Best Gay Erotica 1996—all dealing with
After looking through the
homosexual subject matters.127
material, the parole officer arrested Farrell.128
At Farrell’s revocation hearing, the parole officer testified
that the book, Scum, and magazine, My Comrade, were
pornographic because they contained pictures of nude men in
certain positions.129 The officer also testified, in general, that
possession of Playboy would have been prohibited.130 Regarding
purely textual material, the officer testified that he would not
arrest someone but would “run it past [his] supervisor and let
him make that decision.”131 Finally, according to the parole
officer, if a parolee possessed a photograph of the statue of David,
then the officer would have “locked [the parolee] up for that.”132
Farrell testified that he believed the prohibition related to
“[t]he kind of stuff that you would get in an adult book store or
an x-rated movie or a book that has pictures of people engaging
in sex activity where the whole purpose of the book is to arouse
your sexual appetite.”133 He further explained that he believed
pornographic material contained “pictures of people engaging in
sexual activity . . . whose sole purpose is to pander [to] people’s

124

Id.
Id. Under New York law, a parole officer can impose special conditions. See
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 9, § 8003.2(l) (2010).
126
Farrell, 449 F.3d at 477.
127
Id. The officer looked through the publications and saw sexually explicit
pictures. Id. He did not read the text. Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 479.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 479–80.
132
Id. at 479. The parole officer did not know what the statue of David was, so
counsel for Farrell described it as “a large sculpture of a nude youth with his
genitals exposed and visible,” prompting the officer’s response. Id.
133
Id. at 480.
125
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sexual arousal.”134 Farrell did not believe that either the book or
the magazine were pornographic.135
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) presiding over the
revocation hearing found that the magazine was not
pornographic but that the book was.136 The ALJ noted that the
magazine was satirical in nature.137 However, the book, Scum,
contained “numerous pictures [of] frontal male nudity, erect
penises and males fondling their genitals.”138
Scum also
contained “numerous stories which describe sexual encounters
involving underage males.”139 The plaintiff’s parole was revoked
and he was ordered held until the expiration of his maximum
sentence.140
On appeal, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that the term
“pornography” was “vague if it was not tied to a specific
definition.”141 It noted that “[w]here the offense of conviction
does not involve pornography, a statutory definition of that term
in a criminal statute that the defendant has never encountered
no more provides notice of the meaning of that term than does
any other definition of pornography.”142 The court also noted that
the condition did not provide any standards for those who
enforced the term.143
The Second Circuit held, however, that, even though the
term is inherently vague, the nature of the book, Scum, was such
that any reasonable definition of pornography would have
included it and that Farrell was on notice that the book was
prohibited.144 The condition “provided adequate standards for the
parole officers to determine whether Scum was prohibited, even
though its application to other materials would have been

134

Id.
Id. The plaintiff felt that the magazine was satirical in nature and not meant
to arouse sexual feeling. Id. Regarding the book, the plaintiff felt like it was a
“history of the way homosexuals lead their lives” and it provided “analysis of the way
sexual behavior is reported in mainstream newspapers.” Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 481.
139
Id.
140
Id. The plaintiff served four-and-a-half months incarceration for the
violation. Id.
141
Id. at 486.
142
Id. at 487.
143
Id. at 493.
144
Id. at 492.
135
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uncertain.”145 In so holding, the Second Circuit noted various
possible definitions of pornography, including Farrell’s own
testimony about what he believed to be pornography, and applied
those definitions to Scum.146 The court, however, admonished the
State for failing to “provide meaningful notice of the scope of the
Special Condition’s prohibition or meaningful limits on an
enforcing officer’s discretion.”147 It concluded, “We hope that
greater efforts will be made in the future to define adequately the
terms of parole conditions dealing with pornographic
materials.”148 Thus, the Second Circuit seemed to adopt the
reasoning of the Third and Ninth Circuits, but refused to apply
the standards to the facts in this particular case.
4.

Fifth Circuit: “Pornography” Is Not Inherently Vague

In contrast to the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Fifth
Circuit, in United States v. Phipps,149 held that, while the phrase
“sexually stimulating” material is vague, the condition must be
read in a “ ‘commonsense way’ because ‘it would be impossible to
list’ every instance of prohibited conduct”150 and this
“commonsense reading of the special condition satisfies the
dictates of due process.”151 In Phipps, Michael Phipps and Dean
Gilley followed a woman as she drove home from work.152 After
she drove into her carport, Phipps put a gun to her head and
then Gilley restrained her in the back seat.153 While Phipps
drove on the highway, Gilley raped the woman while
continuously threatening her.154 Although Phipps and Gilley
switched positions, Phipps did not rape the woman because
Gilley warned Phipps to wait until they got to a motel.155 At a
145

Id. at 494.
Id. at 490–92.
147
Id. at 498.
148
Id.
149
United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2003).
150
Id. at 193 (quoting United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th Cir. 2001)).
151
Id. The court later stated that, because the issue was reviewed for plain error
since the defendant failed to object to the condition when it was imposed, it would
reserve the question whether the court would uphold a similar condition when
reviewed de novo. Id. at 194 n.20. However, the court later reaffirmed the holding in
Phipps in an unpublished decision. See United States v. Hartshorn, 163 F. App’x
325, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2006).
152
Phipps, 319 F.3d at 180.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 180–81.
155
Id. at 181.
146
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motel, Phipps was about to rape the woman when Gilley, who
was nervous, stopped him.156 Later, they drove with the woman
to a nearby alley, but the woman was able to flee, fearing for her
life.157 Neither Phipps nor Gilley chased her.158 They were
arrested the next day.159 Both were found guilty by a jury of
conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, use of a firearm
during and in relation to the kidnapping, carjacking, and using a
firearm during and in relation to the carjacking,160 and both were
sentenced to 65 years, 9 months and then to a term of supervised
release.161
A condition of the supervised release was that defendants
could not possess “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating
materials” and could not patronize “any place where such
material or entertainment is available.”162 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit admitted that the term was “somewhat vague” and noted
that “a more definite condition might be desirable,” but upheld
the condition anyway given the wide discretion afforded to a
district court and the commonsense manner in which the
condition can be read.163 The Fifth Circuit, by applying a
“commonsense reading” to the condition, rejected defendants’
argument that the condition could apply to lingerie
advertisements or the “Song of Solomon.”164 The court also noted
that the condition was narrowed by another condition imposed on
the defendants that prohibited them from visiting any place
where sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material is
available.165 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the condition
prohibited the defendants from viewing sexually stimulating
material that is of the type that is available at strip clubs, adult
bookstores, and adult theaters.166

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192–93.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. DEFINING PORNOGRAPHY
A.

Policy Arguments for a More Specific Definition

In addition to the constitutional issue of vagueness, there are
three reasons justifying the requirement that sentencing courts,
when imposing a condition of supervised release prohibiting the
possession of pornography, should provide a specific definition of
“pornography.”
First, a sufficiently specific definition furthers the goal of
transitioning a convict from rigid and restrictive prison life back
into society, where he of she can lead a more productive and wellmeaning life. Judges do not impose conditions to arbitrarily
punish the person. Because conditions are not meant to punish
people on supervised release, a more specific definition will
further the goals of supervised release. A more specific definition
will also provide the probationer with an objective set of criteria
that will allow that person to avoid any conduct that would send
him or her back to prison. Furthermore, if supervised release is
meant to assist the probationer in becoming a productive
member of society, undefined conditions cut against this purpose
because that probationer will not know what conduct is
prohibited and what is not.
Second, a more specific definition would be more efficient by
conserving judicial and administrative resources. Arresting and
revoking supervised release consumes a lot of time, effort, and
money.167 In addition to the time and expense of arresting and

167
In 2007, in the federal system, there were 116,221 people under postconviction supervision. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 13 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/front/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. This
represents a twenty-four percent increase since 1998. Id. Also, there was an 18.6%
increase over criminal cases filed in 2007 as compared to 1998, and an almost
eighty-percent increase over pending cases. Id. In 2007, there were 2,460 sexual
offense criminal cases commenced, an increase of over eighty-five percent from 2003.
Id. at 228. Nationwide, as of 2006, there were over five million adult men and
women on probation or parole, a thirty-four percent increase from 1995. See Glaze &
Bonczar, supra note 1, at 1. Also, while child sex offenses comprised a relatively
small share of the total criminal caseload, they are “among the fastest growing
crimes” in the federal system, mainly due to child pornography prosecutions. MARK
MOTIVANS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006,
at 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf; see also
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processing a probationer for a violation of supervised release, a
probationer is entitled to two hearings, both which must occur
within a reasonable time. Moreover, the probationer is entitled
to counsel. The hearings must be on the record, and the judge
must provide a written statement detailing why he or she
revoked the probationer’s supervised release. While this time
and expense is necessary for those who willfully violate
conditions of supervised release, it is patently unnecessary when
the probationer on supervised release is trying to conform his or
her conduct but fails because he or she cannot understand the
condition or because a probation officer decides the probationer
has violated the condition. Such waste can be avoided if a
sentencing judge, at the hearing imposing sentence, provides a
sufficiently specific definition of what constitutes “pornography”
so that the probationer has notice as to what material he or she
may or may not possess.
Finally, requiring a sentencing court to impose a more
specific definition of pornography does not restrict judicial
discretion. The courts will still have the authority to impose the
condition; they will merely be required to include a specific
definition when imposing a prohibition on viewing or possessing
pornography. Also, although courts have wide discretion in
imposing sentences, this discretion is not absolute.
The
Sentencing Guidelines and appellate review curtail a sentencing
court’s ability to sentence a defendant any way it wants. So even
if requiring a more specific definition of pornography would
curtail a judge’s discretion, it would not do so any more
than the Sentencing Guidelines, congressional legislation, or
constitutional principles do.
Finally, courts will probably
welcome a more specific definition rather than struggling to find
a constitutionally permissible definition.
B.

Policy Arguments Against a More Specific Definition

Even though there are compelling constitutional and
practical reasons to require sentencing courts to provide a more
specific definition of pornography in conditions of supervised
release, arguments exist against such a requirement.

Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 172 (1997)
(noting the cost to supervise and the declining funding).
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First, critics argue that a more specific definition of
pornography is not necessary because sufficient safeguards exist
to protect a probationer’s due process rights. For example, a
probation officer will use common sense to determine whether or
not the material in the probationer’s possession constitutes
pornography. Similarly, a district court judge will use reason
and precedent to determine whether a violation of the condition
occurred. Moreover, if for some reason both the probation officer
and judge err, the revocation of supervised release can be
appealed. Finally, while a probationer is not entitled to all the
due process requirements of a criminal trial, he still has the right
to be heard at two hearings, the ability to be represented by
counsel, and the opportunity to call and question witnesses.
This argument, however, is not persuasive. It ignores
Supreme Court precedent that arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement violates due process rights.
This tenet is
meaningless when a condition is completely subjective and relies
on the personal predilections of those charged with the
condition’s enforcement.
The purpose behind the void-forvagueness doctrine is to encourage sufficient specificity in the
statute or condition so that a law-abiding citizen can tailor their
conduct to avoid violating the law. This doctrine is extremely
important since being convicted of a crime deprives a person of
liberty. To require a person to be found in violation of a
condition, then sent to jail, and remain in jail while his or her
appeal is being reviewed because that person reasonably did not
understand what conduct was prohibited strikes at the very
heart of the Constitution. Moreover, it is less efficient to discern
ex post facto whether material is pornographic than to ensure
that a probationer knows the law and can follow it.
Second, critics assert that requiring sentencing courts to use
specific language when imposing a condition banning
pornography undermines judicial discretion to craft an
appropriate sentence tailored to the individual wrongdoer.
Sentencing judges need latitude to craft individualized sentences
that are tailored to the particular factual situation. Forcing a
judge to impose a specific definition curtails this ability.
This argument is problematic for several reasons. First,
judges usually impose conditions prohibiting possession of
pornography when the probationer has been convicted of a sex
offense, but they do not distinguish between sex offenses. Thus,
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a person convicted of rape of an adult woman and a person
convicted of possessing child pornography will probably get the
same prohibition—no possession of pornography, even legal adult
pornography—even though the crimes are very different.168 Also,
if a judge wants to limit the scope of the prohibition beyond the
definition provided, he or she is free to do so.
Second, as noted above, judges do not have unlimited
discretion to impose whatever sentence they like. Not only are
judges constrained by constitutional concerns, they must
sentence according to statute and are required to consult the
Sentencing Guidelines.
Moreover, a judge who fails to
adequately explain any departure from the Guidelines risks
reversal on appeal. Finally, requiring judges to define what they
mean when imposing otherwise vague conditions does not impact
their discretion; it merely requires them to be more precise in the
language they use. Judges are still free to impose a condition
prohibiting possession of pornography.
Finally, critics argue that if the definition is too specific, then
the probationer will be able to tailor his or her activity right up to
the line and will act with a wrongful state of mind but not be
punished. If the condition is too specific, then the probationer

168
There is a sociological argument that it may not be wise to prohibit access to
legal pornography. Under the “catharsis theory,” pornography acts as a safety valve
because the repeated exposure of pornographic images will decrease the desire and
interest of the viewer. See LIZ KELLY, RACHEL WINGFIELD, SHEILA BURTON & LINDA
REGAN, SPLINTERED LIVES: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE CONTEXT OF
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND CHILD PROTECTION 23 (1995), available at
http://www.barnardos.org.uk/splintered_lives_report.pdf; see also Ronald J. Berger,
Patricia Searles & Charles E. Cottle, Ideological Contours of the Contemporary
Pornography Debate, 11 FRONTIERS 30, 34 (1990) (noting that in popular opinion a
majority of both men and women that pornography provides “an outlet for bottled-up
impulses”); W. Cody Wilson, Facts Versus Fears: Why Should We Worry About
Pornography?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1971, at 105, 115. But see
Diana E.H. Russell & Natalie J. Purcell, Exposure to Pornography as a Cause of
Child Sexual Victimization, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, & VIOLENCE 59,
60–61 (Nancy E. Dowd, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006)
(criticizing catharsis theory); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 599 n.71 (noting that catharsis theory has little
empirical support). Therefore, it would seem, prohibiting a sex offender from viewing
legal adult pornography may have the opposite intended effect of increasing the
offender’s desire to the point that he commits a crime. Of course, there is an equally
plausible argument that viewing pornography fuels the sex offender’s fantasies and
actually increases the offender’s desire to commit a sex offense. See Dana A.
Fraytak, The Influence of Pornography on Rape and Violence Against Women: A
Social Science Approach, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 291–92 (2001).
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will know exactly how far to the line he or she can go. Thus,
while the probationer is engaging in conduct that goes against
the purposes of imposing the condition, the court will have no
choice but to release the probationer and find that there was no
violation.
This argument is also faulty. A more specific definition is
designed to give a probationer notice and prevent arbitrary
enforcement. It will encompass the type of material that a judge
would have reasonably determined to be pornographic. If
anything, a probationer will be sure to tailor his or her behavior
to not violate the condition, thus satisfying the rehabilitative and
public safety purposes of imposing conditions of supervised
release. In any case, this argument applies equally to criminal
statutes, but courts have not struggled with requiring sufficient
specificity in those statutes. For example, the Chicago law
struck down in City of Chicago v. Morales prohibited “criminal
street gang members” from remaining in any one place with no
apparent purpose.169 As the Court noted, a person with a guilty
mindset could avoid violating the law by making apparent his
purpose in remaining in one place, while a person with an
innocent mindset could be found guilty under the law by simply
being with a family member who happened to be a gang
member.170
C.

A Modest Proposal

The Sentencing Guidelines need a straightforward, clear
definition of “pornography” that will not only give a probationer
clear notice as to what material is prohibited and prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, but will also ensure
that the goals of supervised release, rehabilitation, and public
safety remain intact.
Over the years, judges, legislators, and scholars have
struggled to define “pornography.” They have been hampered,
however, because the need to define “pornography” existed in the
context of regulating it.
Those who attempted to define
“pornography” did so to restrict its dissemination without
violating a person’s First Amendment right to create and possess
non-obscene material. Fortunately, in the context of conditions of
169
170

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47 (1999) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 62–63; see also supra note 57.
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supervised release, no such problem exists because people on
supervised release can have their constitutional rights
curtailed.171
While the term “obscenity” has been defined by the Supreme
Court,172 “pornography” carries no such legal definition. Courts
have looked to the dictionary definition, which they quickly
dismiss as too broad173 and have also stuck down certain
legislative attempts to define “pornography.”174 Scholars have
also attempted to define “pornography,” with little acceptance.175
In the criminal context, Congress has defined “pornography”
as it relates to child pornography.176 Thus, when advising district
courts on how to impose a sufficiently specific definition of
“pornography,” the circuit courts have used that definition of
“pornography” to illustrate a definition that is sufficiently
specific. That statute defines “pornography” as “any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made
or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of
sexually explicit conduct.”177
“Sexually explicit conduct” is
defined as “actual or simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether

171

See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973); see also Pope v. Illinois,
481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297 (1978);
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301, 305 (1977).
173
See, e.g., United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2001).
174
See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 1985)
(striking statute down on First Amendment grounds), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
175
See James Lindgren, Defining Pornography, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1155–
59 (1993). Lindgren empirically studies the application of three different definitions
of pornography. See id. at 1156. The first definition is simply the Miller obscenity
test. See id. at 1159. The second definition was the definition drafted by Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, which was struck down by the Seventh Circuit
on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 1156–57. Lindgren notes that this definition
“has three elements: graphic sexual explicitness, the subordination of women, and
depictions of any one of a long list of specific sexual acts.” Id. at 1157. Finally,
Lindgren tests a definition proposed by Cass Sunstein: “In short, regulable
pornography must (a) be sexually explicit, (b) depict women as enjoying or deserving
some form of physical abuse, and (c) have the purpose and effect of producing sexual
arousal.” Id. at 1158 n.16 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 592). Lindgren notes that all three of these
definitions were criticized for being overbroad, underbroad, and vague. See id. at
1157–59.
176
See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2006).
177
Id. § 2256(8).
172
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between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality;
(iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person.”178
While this definition provides a specific definition of
“pornography” and would survive any vagueness challenge, this
definition is both under inclusive and over inclusive of the
material it would prohibit. Thus, certain material that the court
would not intend to prohibit would be prohibited, and other
material that the court did intend to prohibit would not be
prohibited. For example, a probationer would be prohibited from
viewing an art house or foreign film that contains significant
artistic merit and is considered to be a cinematic masterpiece
because it might contain simulated sexual intercourse.179 On the
other hand, this definition would not prohibit possession of
Playboy or other nude depictions of the human body, unless the
probation officer determined that the depiction was a “lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.”180 Therefore, while this
is a good starting definition, some minor modifications are
necessary to ensure the material the court intends to prohibited
are in fact prohibited and no more.
The following definition of pornography should accomplish
these goals: Pornography shall be defined as

178
Id. § 2256(2)(A). The statute also has a specific definition related to child
pornography that involves computer generated images. See id. § 2256(8)(B), (2)(B).
Essentially, it adds “graphic” and “lascivious” to the definition of sexually explicit
conduct. See id. § 2256(2)(B).
179
Movies that come to mind are the Oscar-nominated LAST TANGO IN PARIS
(United Artists 1973) with Marlon Brando, see Jack Mathews, Wanted: New MPAA
Boss—It May Be Time for Jack Valenti To Step Aside, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 1,
1999, at 19; HENRY & JUNE (Universal Pictures 1990), the first movie to receive the
MPAA’s NC-17 rating, see Peter Rainer, Wispy ‘Henry & June’ All Soul, No Body,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1990, at F1 (“[I]ts eroticism is far more suggestive than
explicit.”); and the Mexican film of forbidden love, LIKE WATER FOR CHOCOLATE
(Miramax Films 1992), which became the highest grossing foreign film released in
the United States at the time of its release, see Beth Kleid, Morning Report, L.A.
TIMES, May 2, 1994, at F2. All of these films contain scenes of simulated sexual
intercourse.
180
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A). It should be noted that the book that the Second
Circuit found to be pornographic could arguably fit under this definition because it
contained pictures of nude men, which the Second Circuit noted showed men with
erect penises and “some of the men appear[ed] to be touching themselves.” See
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 2006).
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(a)(1) any visual depiction, including any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or
other means, of sexually explicit conduct; or (2) any textual
material describing sexually explicit conduct accompanied by
visual depictions of the naked human body, such
accompaniment to be taken from the publication as a whole;
and
(b) that a reasonable person could believe is intended to arouse
sexual excitement.
(c) “Sexually explicit conduct” is defined as actual or simulated
(1) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same
or opposite sex; (2) bestiality; (3) masturbation; (4) sadistic or
masochistic abuse; or (5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of any person.

The proposed definition, while incorporating many aspects of
the definition from 18 U.S.C. § 2256, both expands and limits
that definition so that courts can be sure that what they intend
to prohibit is actually prohibited. The definition is expanded by
including textual material in a publication accompanied by
pictures of nude people in the definition. Thus, a probationer
would now know for sure that he or she cannot possess a book
that has graphic descriptions of sexually explicit conduct but only
has pictures of nude people. The probationer will also be on
notice that a book of literary erotica will be acceptable because it
will usually not contain any pictures at all. The definition is
limited by adding an intent requirement. To be clear, the
subjective intent of the creator is not the issue. A court must
merely determine whether a reasonable person, upon viewing the
material, would reasonably think that the creator intended to
arouse sexual excitement in the viewer. Thus, art house and
foreign films, as well as art work such as paintings and statues,
considered to be of high artistic quality will not fall within this
definition because a reasonable person viewing the material as a
whole could conclude that the material was not designed to
arouse sexual excitement, which is required in subsection (b).
Thus a probationer will have notice “that will enable [him or
her] to understand what conduct [the condition] prohibits.”181
This definition will also prevent arbitrary and discriminatory

181

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (plurality opinion).
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enforcement since it provides the probation officer with a
standard to enforce the condition. For example, photographs or
videos of hard-core pornography are explicitly prohibited. Also,
Playboy, Penthouse, and other similar magazines featuring nude
people will be prohibited. However, books such as Lolita and
medical textbooks would not be prohibited, although a book like
the Kama Sutra would be because it has visual depictions of
sexually explicit conduct. Also, magazines like GQ, Maxim, and
Vogue would not be prohibited because they generally contain no
nudity, but even if they do, it is not “lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of any person,” and a reasonable person
could conclude that the creator did not intend to arouse sexual
excitement. Because there is now a definition of pornography, a
probationer will no longer be able to challenge the condition on
vagueness grounds.
Moreover, providing this language in the Sentencing
Guidelines will not limit discretion. Judges still have the ability
to impose the condition. This definition merely assists them in
providing them with language that can be used to accomplish
what the courts intend when they impose the condition.
Furthermore, because of this definition, probation officers and
judges will not be burdened trying to determine whether the
probationer possesses material that is pornographic. This will
lead to more efficiency and reduce the strain on an otherwise
overburdened system. Also, probation officers can spend more
time rehabilitating the probationer as opposed to punishing
someone who reasonably believed his conduct did not violate any
condition.
This definition could be implemented in either of two ways.
First, the Sentencing Commission could include the definition in
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual by adding subsection (D)
to section 5B1.3(d)(7).
This method is preferable because
probationers are presumed to know the statutes, and therefore, if
the court failed to define “pornography” when imposing the
condition, the probationer could not challenge it on vagueness
grounds since it is defined in the Sentencing Guidelines.182
Alternatively, the courts themselves could include the definition
in a condition prohibiting possession of pornography because
182

It should be noted, though, that sentencing courts should still specifically
state the language of the statute when imposing a sentence to ensure that any doubt
is removed from the probationer’s mind.
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18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22) allows the courts to impose conditions
they think appropriate in the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The right to have fair warning about prohibited conduct is an
inviolate right under due process, and this right applies both to
those who have not committed crimes and to those who have
been convicted of crimes. The essence of due process prohibits
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Just like everyone
else, a probationer must know with sufficient specificity what
conduct is prohibited. For these reasons, when applying a
condition prohibiting pornography, courts must define that term
with sufficient specificity. The specific definition proposed will
do that while balancing the needs of judicial discretion to impose
sentences, the rights of the probationer, and the goals of the
Guidelines to protect the public and promote rehabilitation.

